AMENDMENTS IN THE CLAIMS

1. (currently amended) A method for securely creating an endorsement certificate for a device in an insecure environment, said method comprising:

generating for a valid device an endorsement key pair that includes a private key and a public key, wherein said private key is not public readable;

creating a non-public, secure value that is provided to both a plurality of valid devices and a credential server, wherein the value is a first value that is provided to a first set of said plurality of valid devices and a second set of said plurality of valid devices are provided a second value, based on a pre-defined method for determining when to change said first value to said second value from among: a passage of a pre-set amount of device manufacturing time and a preset number of manufactured devices from among the plurality of valid devices, wherein said non-public, secure value is a secret number;

forwarding transmitting a first copy of said secret number via a secure communication medium to said credential server;

hashing a second copy of said secret number with a public key from said endorsement key pair;

combining a first hash result from said hashing step with the public key to create [[the]] an endorsement key (EK);

forwarding transmitting said EK to said credential server to initiate a credential process; verifying by utilizing said non-public, secure value that an endorsement key of said valid device is a valid endorsement key of said endorsement key pair that was generated during manufacture of said valid device, wherein a function of a first copy of said non-public, secure value within said credential server matches a similar function of a second copy of said non-public, secure value associated with the endorsement key received at the credential server, said verifying step further comprising:

receiving said EK from said device at the credential server,[[;]]

calculating an expected hash value by hashing the public key within the received EK with the first copy of said secret number received during said forwarding step—to provide a second hashed value,[[;]]

comparing the first hashed value from within the EK with the second expected hash value,[[;]] and

confirming said EK is from a valid device when said comparing step results in a match; and

in response to confirming said EK is from a valid device, inserting an endorsement certificate into said device to indicate that said device is an approved device by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the device.

2 - 4. (canceled)

5. (original) The method of Claim 1, wherein following said verifying step said method further comprises:

initially storing the credential in a database of said credential server;
monitoring for a request from a customer to provide said certificate to said device; and
following a receipt of said customer request, transmitting said certificate to said device
to be inserted within the device.

- 6. (original) The method of Claim 1, wherein said endorsement certificate is oncewriteable public-readable and is utilized for signing said public key during communication from and to said device.
- 7. (original) The method of Claim 1, wherein said value is injected into said device, and said value is a single-use parameter, said method further comprising immediately destroying said value within said device following a creation of said EK.
- 8. (original) The method of Claim 1, wherein said credential server is remotely located from a vendor manufacturing said device and said method comprises communicating said value from said device to said credential server via a secure communication medium.

9. (canceled)

10. (original) The method of Claim 1, wherein said device is a trusted platform module (TPM).